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Introduction
Richard and Janet Himsel found that living on their property—
land Richard’s family had owned since 1940—had become utterly
unbearable.1 The stench and side effects of the emissions from the hograising facilities that had been erected less than a half-mile away had
forced Janet to cease living in their home on advice of her doctor,2 and
kept the Himsels’ children and grandchildren from visiting.3 The
emissions from the facilities stung their eyes and throats, and made it
difficult to eat and sleep.4 The facilities were so close to the Himsels’
1.

Emily Hopkins, Hendricks County Homeowners Wanted Relief from the
Smell of 8,000 Neighboring Hogs; Indiana Court Weighs In, IndyStar
(Apr. 26, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/
environment/2019/04/26/right-farm-indiana-court-rejects-nuisancecase-hendricks-county/3573056002/ [https://perma.cc/YB6T-BRGY]
(“[S]taying in the house is at times unbearable, Himsel said.”).

2.

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11–12, Himsel v. Himsel, 122 N.E.3d
935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (No. 18A-PL-645) [hereinafter Himsel Petition].

3.

See Hopkins, supra note 1.

4.

See id.; Samantha Horton, After Supreme Court Rejects Hearing
Right to Farm Case, Both Sides Look to Policy Changes, WFYI
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residence that the hog-raising buildings could be seen from the second
floor of the Himsels’ home, just beyond the corn field that buffered the
neighboring property.5
Richard considered the prospect of selling the property—including
the house he was born in over 70 years prior and had occupied with his
wife since 1994—but knew that no buyer would be motivated to
purchase a property directly adjacent to an industrialized hog facility.6
Even just considering selling the property was painful—Richard and
Janet had created their life together there, and they had planned to
spend their retirement there.7 Moreover, the property was now worth
less than half what it was prior to construction of the Concentrated
Animal Feeding Operation (CAFO).8 Richard and Janet had
themselves farmed on their land up until 2000,9 but their own history
of farming did not deter them from bringing a nuisance suit in 2015
against their neighbors—neighbors who happened to be Richard’s
cousin and nephews.10
The Himsel defendants had, for nearly twenty years, used their
property primarily for crop agriculture.11 In 2013, they successfully
petitioned for a rezoning of their land from agricultural residential
(AGR) to agricultural intense (AGI).12 This enabled them to switch
from crop agriculture to the operation of concentrated hog raising
facilities—an operation that the previous zoning restrictions would not
have permitted.13 Richard Himsel, and other community members,

Indianapolis (Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.wfyi.org/news/articles/
after-supreme-court-rejects-hearing-right-to-farm-case-both-sideslook-to-policy-changes [https://perma.cc/9D56-BE75].
5.

See Hopkins, supra note 1.

6.

Id.; Himsel v. Himsel, 122 N.E.3d 935, 941 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

7.

See Cailen LaBarge, Bringing Big Ag’s Right to Harm to the U.S. Supreme
Court, Sentient Media (Oct. 1, 2020), https://sentientmedia.org/bringingbig-ags-right-to-harm-to-the-u-s-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/
82SU-X3QR].

8.

Himsel Petition, supra note 2, at 14 (acknowledging a 60% devaluation in
the Himsels’ property value).

9.

Himsel, 122 N.E.3d at 940.

10.

Hopkins, supra note 1.

11.

Himsel, 122 N.E.3d at 939 (“Between at least 1994 and 2013, the Farm
had been used consistently for crops.”). But see LaBarge, supra note 7
(describing the Himsel defendants’ property as having been used for crop
agriculture for “the past century”).

12.

Himsel, 122 N.E.3d at 939.

13.

Id.
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vocally opposed the rezoning to no avail.14 The Himsel defendants
proceeded with construction and operation of “two 4,000-hog
production buildings,” wherein a new batch of hogs would come in
roughly every six months to replace the grown hogs that were shipped
out.15 Within seven months of the rezoning, Richard and Janet found
themselves living within a half-mile of 8,000 hogs and the accompanying
pits of those hogs’ excrement16—pits collecting nearly four million
gallons of waste annually.17 This became the reality of the Himsels’
lives—a reality which Indiana courts upheld under Indiana’s Right to
Farm Act.18
This Note discusses the general origins and evolution of the right
to farm as it has been memorialized in the legislation of each of the fifty
states,19 with a particular focus on Indiana’s Right to Farm Act, as
applied in Himsel to immunize a concentrated hog feeding operation
from a nuisance claim brought by rural neighbors.20 Such concentrated,
industrial, agricultural operations, compared to traditional, smallerscale agricultural operations, impose unique and wide-ranging effects on
those living around them. A full discussion of those effects follows in
Part I.
Significant policy concerns arise from the immunization of these
agricultural operations from nuisance liability, particularly when
immunization is applied outside of the context of urban encroachment
and where the neighbor did not “come to the nuisance.”21 This
immunization challenges the resolution of the individual property
14.

LaBarge, supra note 7 (“[H]undreds of residents attended zoning hearings
to oppose the farm’s change in designation from ‘Agriculture Residential’
to ‘Agriculture Intense.’”); Himsel, 122 N.E.3d at 939 (“Following a public
hearing on March 12, 2013, at which Richard Himsel spoke in opposition
to the rezoning, the Plan Commission unanimously recommended
approval of the requested rezoning.”).

15.

Himsel, 122 N.E.3d at 940.

16.

Id. (noting that rezoning was approved March 26, 2013, and the CAFOs
were filled with hogs on October 2, 2013); Himsel Petition, supra note 2,
at 6.

17.

Himsel Petition, supra note 2, at 11.

18.

Himsel, 122 N.E.3d at 945 (holding that the Himsels’ nuisance claim was
barred by Indiana’s Right to Farm Act), transfer denied sub nom. Himsel
v. 4/9 Livestock, LLC, 143 N.E.3d 950 (Ind. 2020).

19.

See infra notes 87–101 and accompanying text.

20.

See infra notes 102–13 and accompanying text.

21.

See infra notes 90–92 and accompanying text; see also Buchanan v.
Simplot Feeders, Ltd. P’ship, 952 P.2d 610, 615–16 (Wash. 1998)
(“[Washington’s right to farm law] should not be read to insulate
agricultural enterprises from nuisance actions brought by an agricultural
or other rural plaintiff, especially if the plaintiff occupied the land before
the nuisance activity was established.”).
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interest—the interest on which the action of nuisance has been founded
for centuries.22
This Note subsequently analyzes the right to farm—specifically,
broad formulations of the right to farm such as that of Indiana—under
a due process framework.23 At least as applied to the Himsels, the right
to farm has impermissibly and inappropriately burdened property and
liberty interests. Ultimately, it asserts that the right to farm as it exists
now in many states, including Indiana, has failed to accomplish an
appropriate balancing between the interests of agricultural operations
and those of neighboring property owners. This has led to absurd and
unjust outcomes for property owners such as the Himsels.
In addition to placing heavy burdens on recognized due-process
interests of neighbors, the vast and substantiated negative impacts of
CAFOs on neighbors create serious policy concerns.24 Right-to-farm
legislation often leaves little-to-no realistic opportunity for neighbors to
vindicate their property and liberty interests, protect their health, and
preserve the meaningful bonds and associations they have created
within their communities.
I therefore advocate that the right to farm be narrowed back to its
original form—limited in application to circumstances in which the
neighbor “came to the nuisance.”25 Doing so would establish a more
appropriate balance between the interests of agricultural operations and
their neighbors and would alleviate the due process and policy concerns
that exist now.

I.

The Rise of Concentrated Animal Feeding
Operations and Their Impact on Neighbors

Agriculture has long been an important American industry—so
much so that some states have enshrined farming as a right protected
by their state constitutions.26 But the agricultural setting that exists in
America today is dramatically different than that which existed mere
decades ago.27 The traditional family farm has been, and is being,
22.

See infra notes 150–69 (discussing the historical importance of this property
interest and its fundamentality).

23.

See infra Part IV.

24.

See infra Part I.

25.

See infra notes 89–94 and accompanying text.

26.

Joseph Malanson, Note, Returning Right-to-Farm Laws to Their Roots, 97
Wash. U. L. Rev. 1577, 1578, 1581 (2020). Indiana’s Senate considered, but
ultimately did not approve, a proposed amendment to enshrine the right to
farm in Indiana’s constitution. Ryan Sabalow, Indiana Senate Kills ‘Right to
Farm’ Amendment, IndyStar (Feb. 24, 2015, 2:02 PM), https://
www.indystar.com/story/news/2015/02/24/indiana-senate-kills-right-farmamendment/23944627/ [https://perma.cc/V5V3-82AN].

27.

See Malanson, supra note 26, at 1579.
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gradually replaced by industrial agricultural operations.28 Large-scale,
corporate agriculture has surged over the last several decades, while the
prevalence of smaller-scale, independent farming has dropped.29
Among these industrial operations are CAFOs.30 CAFOs are highdensity facilities that contain non-aquatic animals for at least forty-five
days per year and which do not sustain “crops, vegetation, or forage
growth . . . over a normal growing period.”31 These facilities are
classified as either Large, Medium, or Small CAFOs, depending on
various factors, including the number of animals they contain and the
means by which the facility discharges waste into the water supply.32
Large CAFOs commonly house tens of thousands of animals within the
same building.33 A Large CAFO dedicated to swine, for example, houses
at least 2,500 swine weighing over 55 pounds each, or at least 10,000
swine weighing under 55 pounds each.34 Such facilities are designed to
optimize large-scale production, with speed and cost efficiency as
predominant concerns, containing animals in a “factory-like setting

28.

E.g., Jonathan Morris, Comment, “One Ought Not Have So Delicate a
Nose”: CAFOs, Agricultural Nuisance, and the Rise of the Right to Farm,
47 Env’t L. 261, 272 (2017).

29.

See, e.g., Nat’l Agric. Stat. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 2017
Census of Agriculture: United States Summary and State Data
2 (2019), https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/AgCensus/2017/
Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_1_US/usv1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Y9TM-PWYE] (showing, in Figure 1, approximately 9% increase from
2012 in legal identification of U.S. farms as “Corporation” and
approximately 4% decrease from 2012 in legal identification as “Family
or individual”); Chris McGreal, How America’s Food Giants Swallowed
the Family Farms, Guardian (Mar. 9, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2019/mar/09/american-food-giants-swallow-the-familyfarms-iowa [https://perma.cc/AEL5-FEW7] (discussing the decline of
independent pig and cattle farms since 1985); Madeleine Skaller,
Comment, Protecting the Right to Harm: Why State Right to Farm Laws
Should Not Shield Factory Farms From Nuisance Liability, 27 San
Joaquin Agric. L. Rev. 209, 210 (2017).

30.

Carrie Hribar, Nat’l Ass’n of Loc. Bds. of Health,
Understanding Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations and
Their Impact on Communities 1 (Mark Schultz ed., 2010),
https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/ehs/docs/understanding_cafos_nalboh.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CHZ7-BVKB].

31.

Id.; Morris, supra note 28, at 272–73.

32.

Env’t Prot. Agency, Regulatory Definitions of Large CAFOs,
Medium CAFO, and Small CAFOs, https://www3.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/
sector_table.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RQM-FX3T]; 40 C.F.R. § 122.23 (2012).

33.

See Env’t Prot. Agency, supra note 32 (showing that a turkey CAFO is
designated as “Large” if it houses at least 55,000 turkeys and a sheep or lamb
CAFO is designated as “Large” if it houses at least 10,000 sheep or lambs).

34.

Id.
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where the animals are . . . densely packed in pens or crates.”35 The
animals’ waste is typically collected in outdoor lagoons—“open-air
storage ponds”36—or in pits underneath the animal confinement
buildings.37 The amount of waste accumulated through these facilities
is far from insubstantial. Hogs, for example, produce up to eight times
as much waste as humans,38 with a single hog producing an average of
11 pounds of waste per day.39 And unlike for humans, there exist no
sewage-treatment facilities to deal with this waste safely.40
The intensive production and dense animal confinement inherent in
the operation of CAFOs are associated with more significant impacts
on the surrounding environment and on neighbors.41 Documented issues
include degradation of surrounding water and air quality, health
implications from aerial emissions,42 increased prevalence of odors,
insects, and noise,43 and reduction in surrounding property values.44
CAFOs produce greater levels of aerial emissions due to their size
and concentration, and areas surrounding CAFOs experience reduced

35.

See Himsel Petition, supra note 2, at 9 (citing Hribar, supra note 30, at 1).

36.

Cordon M. Smart, Comment, The “Right to Commit Nuisance” in North
Carolina: A Historical Analysis of the Right-to-Farm Act, 94 N.C. L.
Rev. 2097, 2106 (2016).

37.

Himsel Petition, supra note 2, at 9.

38.

Smart, supra note 36, at 2106; cf. Robbin Marks, Nat’l Res. Def.
Council & The Clean Water Network, Cesspools of Shame: How
Factory Farm Lagoons and Sprayfields Threaten Environmental
and Public Health 3 (2001), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/
cesspools.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BQR-X9FN] (“A single hog produces two to
four times the amount of waste as a human produces . . . .”).

39.

Talia Buford, A Hog Waste Agreement Lacked Teeth, and Some North
Carolinians Say They’re Left to Suffer, ProPublica (Nov. 23, 2018, 5:00
AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/a-hog-waste-agreement-lackedteeth-and-some-north-carolinians-say-left-to-suffer
[https://perma.cc/S86R-3NBK].

40.

Hribar, supra note 30, at 2.

41.

See, e.g., C.M. Williams, CAFOs: Issues and Development of New Waste
Treatment Technology, 10 Penn State Env’t L. Rev. 217, 218 (2002)
(acknowledging the health and environmental impacts attributable to
concentrated animal feeding operations); Smart, supra note 36, at 2104
(describing CAFOs as “posing serious environmental and public health
threats to not only neighboring landowners but also [to] surrounding
communit[ies]”); Skaller, supra note 29, at 217 (“CAFOs present uniquely
dangerous hazards to human and environmental health by creating large
amounts of waste and emitting harmful pollutants in greater quantities
than smaller farms.”).

42.

Williams, supra note 41, at 218.

43.

Hribar, supra note 30, at 3.

44.

Smart, supra note 36, at 2107.
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air quality as a result.45 These emissions include gaseous emissions—
such as ammonia, hydrogen sulfide, and methane—which are primarily
caused by the decomposition of manure.46 A testing of the ammonia
levels on the Himsels’ property, for example, discovered levels “far
exceeding ordinary levels” of similarly rural properties not located near
a CAFO.47 Also contributing to reduced air quality is the emission of
particulate matter—mostly dust from animal feed and dried excrement—which is spread by the animals’ movement.48
This reduced air quality can harm the health of neighboring
communities.49 This is particularly true for children, for whom closer
proximity to a CAFO correlates with a greater risk of experiencing
asthma symptoms.50 Ammonia and hydrogen sulfide emissions can
cause irritation to and inflammation of the skin, eyes, and respiratory
tract,51 and exposure to these gases at high concentrations can be fatal.52
Exposure to particulate matter increases the risk of chronic bronchitis
and chronic respiratory symptoms, as well as a decline in lung
function.53 Studies have shown that individuals living within two miles
of swine operations report higher frequencies of nausea, respiratory
problems, headaches, sore throat, and burning eyes, among other
symptoms, compared to a control population residing outside of that
two-mile radius.54 Indeed, the Himsels experienced several of these
symptoms.55
In addition to these health implications, the intensified production
of CAFOs creates odors that reduce the quality of life of those living
on neighboring properties.56 Depending on weather conditions and
specific farming practices, odors from CAFOs are commonly smelled

45.

Hribar, supra note 30, at 5.

46.

Id.

47.

Himsel Petition, supra note 2, at 12.

48.

Hribar, supra note 30, at 5; Williams, supra note 41, at 228.

49.

See Hribar, supra note 30, at 5–7.

50.

Id. at 5-6.

51.

Id. at 6.

52.

Marks, supra note 38, at 26–27 (“At high concentrations, [hydrogen
sulfide] can result in unconsciousness, respiratory failure, and death within
minutes . . . . [Ammonia] . . . in high concentrations, can be fatal.”).

53.

Hribar, supra note 30, at 6.

54.

Morris, supra note 28, at 275.

55.

Himsel Petition, supra note 2, at 12 (“Although invisible to the naked
eye, these emissions are chemical compounds that burn the Himsel’s
[sic] . . . noses, throats and eyes.”).

56.

See Williams, supra note 41, at 230–31.
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three miles away and can be smelled up to six miles away.57 In the
Himsels’ case, the CAFO is much closer. From less than half a mile
away, the smells of the CAFO permeate the inside of the Himsels’
home.58
Odors from CAFOs are generally more significant and far-reaching
than those associated with smaller farms.59 This can be attributed, at
least in part, to the higher levels of excrement and manure created by
CAFOs.60 These odors often force neighboring property owners to
adjust their use of their property—restricting their ability to enjoy time
outdoors or forcing them to keep windows closed year-round.61
Contamination of groundwater and surface water is another serious
issue associated with CAFOs.62 This is significant because “[g]roundwater is a major source of drinking water in the United States.”63 This
is particularly true in rural areas, where agricultural operations are
more prevalent and where their impacts are thus experienced more
closely.64 Animal excrement and urine may leach into the groundwater
through the lagoons where the waste is stored.65 The same result can
occur when manure is overapplied (whether by too frequent application
or application in too large a quantity) to fields.66 Massive spills—
sometimes of millions of gallons of livestock waste—are not
uncommon.67 After Hurricane Florence in 2018, nearly fifty lagoons in
North Carolina overflowed, spilling waste onto surrounding properties
and into bodies of water.68 Such spills and seepage can ultimately

57.

Hribar, supra note 30, at 7.

58.

Himsel Petition, supra note 2, at 11–12.

59.

See id.

60.

See id. at 11.

61.

See id. at 12–13.

62.

See, e.g., Williams, supra note 41, at 218–19.

63.

Hribar, supra note 30, at 3.

64.

Id.

65.

See Williams, supra note 41, at 219.

66.

Hribar, supra note 30, at 3.

67.

See, e.g., Buford, supra note 39 (recounting a 25-million-gallon hog waste
spill in 1995 and dozens of spills from Hurricanes Floyd and Florence);
Marks, supra note 38, at 1.

68.

Wynne Davis, Overflowing Hog Lagoons Raise Environmental Concerns in
North Carolina, NPR (Sept. 22, 2018, 7:54 AM), https://www.npr.org/
2018/09/22/650698240/hurricane-s-aftermath-floods-hog-lagoons-in-northcarolina [https://perma.cc/CYP6-LWAE]; cf. Buford, supra note 39 (asserting
that thirty-three lagoons overflowed as a result of Hurricane Florence).
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contaminate the drinking water of surrounding communities,69 and can
cause or contribute to gastroenteritis (stomach flu), fever, kidney
failure, and nitrate poisoning.70
Dense confinement in facilities where animals share troughs and
inevitably have increased contact with each other also creates a greater
incidence of the spread of pathogens (microorganisms which can be a
source of infection) between animals.71 Increased amounts of feed piles,
trough water, animal waste, and manure-treatment lagoons in these
facilities also attract pests and insects, which further this spread of
pathogens.72 Such exposures risk health implications for “animal care
workers, their families and pets, and casual farm visitors, and [can]
potentially spread into nearby communities.”73 Regardless of whether
they ultimately contribute to the spread of disease, the flies, mosquitos,
and other insects associated with CAFOs can be extremely bothersome
for neighbors, who experience higher levels of flies compared to more
distant residences as a result of their proximity to a CAFO.74

II. The Right to Farm and Create Nuisance in the
Process
As shown in Part I, CAFOs can harm neighboring properties and
the quality of life that neighbors enjoy. Many such harms would
ordinarily constitute private nuisances: “nontrespassory invasion[s] of
another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.”75 But rightto-farm laws immunize agricultural operations from private nuisance
actions, thereby depriving neighbors of those actions’ protective effects.

69.

See Hribar, supra note 30, at 4 (“When groundwater is contaminated
by pathogenic organisms, a serious threat to drinking water can
occur. . . . [And] community members should be concerned about
nitrates and nitrate poisoning.”).

70.

Marks, supra note 38, at 1, 23; Stomach Flu (Gastroenteritis), Cleveland
Clinic, https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases/12418-gastroenteritis
[https://perma.cc/337P-YANY] (last visited Dec. 27, 2020) (describing
gastroenteritis by its common name, the stomach flu).

71.

Shane Rogers & John Haines, Env't Prot. Agency, Detecting
and Mitigating the Environmental Impact of Fecal Pathogens
Originating from Confined Animal Feeding Operations: Review
27 (2005); Marks, supra note 38, at 21.

72.

Rogers, supra note 71, at 29.

73.

Id. at 30–31.

74.

See Hribar, supra note 30, at 8.

75.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821D (Am. L. Inst. 1979).
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A.

Nuisance and its Underlying Property Interest

The action for private nuisance serves to protect the interests of
property owners and possessors,76 and the Restatement (Second) of
Torts defines this interest broadly: comfort, enjoyment that one
normally derives from one’s land, and freedom from annoyance.77 The
concept is grounded in the principle that “one must so use her property
as not to injure that of another.”78 That principle, and its application
in private nuisance, are not absolute, however. A defendant need not
abstain from any and all interference with her neighbor’s enjoyment of
his property—intentional interferences must be unreasonable to be
actionable.79 The analysis turns on the specific circumstances to
determine whether such an interference is unreasonable.80 An unreasonable interference with a neighbor’s enjoyment of her property
may constitute nuisance even if the conduct causing the nuisance is
itself reasonable.81
Historically, the interference with this interest must also cause
significant harm in order for liability to attach.82 Still, successful private
nuisance suits commonly involve issues similar to those discussed above,

76.

Id. cmt. a.

77.

Id. cmt. b. Retention of market value is also included in the use and
enjoyment of one’s land. Thus, an act which negatively affects a property’s
market value is considered an interference with the property owner’s
interest in the use and enjoyment of his land and, therefore, constitutes
nuisance. Louis W. Hensler II, What’s Sic Utere for the Goose: The Public
Nature of the Right to Use and Enjoy Property Suggests a Utilitarian
Approach to Nuisance Cases, 37 N. Ky. L. Rev. 31, 32 (2010).

78.

Ashley Pollard, Note, This Little Piggy Caused a Nuisance: Analyzing
North Carolina’s 2018 Amendment to its Right-to-Farm Act, 14 Liberty
U. L. Rev. 569, 572 (2020) (quoting R. Wilson Freyermuth, Jerome
M. Organ & Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Property and Lawyering
822–24 (3d ed. 2011)).

79.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821D cmt. d (Am. L. Inst. 1979).

80.

Beth Bates Holliday, Cause of Action for Private Nuisance Caused by
Noise, Light, or Odors Emanating from Neighboring Property, in 26
Causes of Action (Second) §§ 5–6 (2004).

81.

Id. § 6 (citing Mayes v. Tabor, 334 S.E.2d 489, 490 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985)).

82.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821D cmt. d (Am. Law. Inst.
1979). (“[F]or a private nuisance, there is no liability without significant
harm.”); accord Holliday, supra note 80, § 5 (“The determination also
turns on whether there is an appreciable, substantial, tangible injury
resulting in actual, material, and physical discomfort to the plaintiff.”).
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including those relating to odors,83 pests,84 dust,85 and interference with
health.86
B.

Immunization of Agricultural Operations from Nuisance Actions

Right-to-farm laws exist in some form in all fifty states.87 These
laws vary widely in precise content, but they all serve to protect
agricultural interests by limiting the conditions under which a neighbor
can succeed in a nuisance action against an agricultural operation.88
A primary and original purpose of right-to-farm laws was to protect
agricultural operations from encroachment by residential developments
into traditionally agricultural land.89 This purpose is reflected in the
policy statements of some states’ right-to-farm laws—evidencing the
governments’ interest in preserving and protecting existing farmland
from encroachment by other land uses and thereby reducing the loss of
agricultural resources.90
This is essentially a codification of the property law doctrine of
coming to the nuisance91—the theory being that established agricultural
operations should not face nuisance liability when a new resident
encroaches upon that existing, nuisance-causing operation and
subsequently sues over the “unavoidable and sometimes unsavory
83.

See, e.g., Baptiste v. Bethlehem Landfill Co., 965 F.3d 214, 218, 222–23
(3d Cir. 2020) (finding private nuisance where noxious odors from landfill
within 2.5-mile radius of neighbors impeded plaintiff property owners from
enjoying their property).

84.

See, e.g., Bowlin v. George, 123 S.E.2d 528, 529–30 (S.C. 1962) (finding
private nuisance where defendant’s automobile wrecking yard created “a
breeding place for mosquitos”).

85.

See, e.g., Norton Shores v. Carr, 265 N.W.2d 802, 805–06 (Mich. Ct. App.
1978) (finding that emission of black dirt dust from defendant’s property
onto plaintiff’s was private nuisance).

86.

See, e.g., Sullivan v. Am. Mfg. Co. of Mass., 33 F.2d 690, 691–92 (4th
Cir. 1929) (finding nuisance where plaintiff’s health was affected by the
dust and fumes emitted by defendant’s property onto plaintiff’s).

87.

E.g., Morris, supra note 28, at 266–67; see also Terence J. Centner,
Governments and Unconstitutional Takings: When Do Right-to-Farm
Laws Go Too Far?, 33 B.C. Env’t Affs. L. Rev. 87, 147–48 (2006).

88.

See, e.g., Beau R. Morgan, Note, Iowa and the Right to Farm: An Analysis
of the Constitutionality of Right to Farm Statutes Across the United
States, 53 Creighton L. Rev. 623, 623 (2020).

89.

E.g., Smart, supra note 36, at 2099–100; Harrison M. Pittman,
Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Right-to-Farm
Acts, 8 A.L.R.6th 465 (2005).

90.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 106-700 (2019) (declaring the policy of the State as
that of conserving development of agricultural land, specifically from
extension of “nonagricultural land uses” into agricultural areas); Ind.
Code § 32-30-6-9 (2019); see also infra note 105 and accompanying text.

91.

Morris, supra note 28, at 277.
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conditions” that operation entails.92 This doctrine, and its codification
through right-to-farm laws, represents a reasonable balancing of the
interests between individual property owners as neighbors and preexisting agricultural operations, and rightfully acknowledges that the
nature of an established property interest, as distinguished from a new
property interest, has “‘legitimate expectations of permanence’” and
thus deserves particular recognition.93 This concept has been
acknowledged for centuries. Blackstone wrote that “if I am entitled to
hold a fair or market, and another person sets up a fair or market so
near mine that he does me a prejudice, it is a nusance [sic] . . . . But in
order to make this out to be a nusance, [sic] it is necessary . . . [t]hat
my market or fair be the elder, otherwise the nusance [sic] lies at my
own door.”94
Generally, that a neighbor came to the nuisance is not an absolute
bar to recovery and is merely a factor to be considered.95 Nonetheless,
courts applying the concept to right-to-farm cases have occasionally
treated this factor as conclusive in declining to find nuisance liability.96
As American agriculture has evolved and become more industrialized, however, the agricultural industry has had tremendous success
in lobbying for more comprehensive right-to-farm laws.97 As a result,
some of these laws have been enacted and applied to provide broader
immunity against nuisance suits, even in instances where the residential
neighbor did not encroach on the agricultural operation—i.e., outside
of the traditional coming-to-the-nuisance context.98 In a significant
92.

See Pittman, supra note 89, § 2.

93.

Malanson, supra note 26, at 1591–93 (reproaching right-to-farm laws that
have been expanded beyond their originally intended application in the
coming-to-the-nuisance context as improper and advocating for a return
to the more limited application of these laws within the context of that
doctrine); see also Pollard, supra note 78, at 586 (describing
implementation of the coming-to-the-nuisance doctrine in right-to-farm
laws as “fair and equitable” and resulting from a “balancing of interests”).

94.

3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *218.

95.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 840D cmts. b, c (Am. L. Inst. 1977).

96.

Margaret Rosso Grossman & Thomas G. Fischer, Protecting the Right to
Farm: Statutory Limits on Nuisance Actions Against the Farmer, 1983
Wis. L. Rev. 95, 108 (1983).

97.

See Hribar, supra note 30, at 11 (“[T]he agribusiness industry lobbied
for and achieved the passage of stricter laws in the 1990s . . . .”).

98.

See Himsel v. Himsel, 122 N.E.3d 935, 943 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)
(determining that the defendants were entitled to protection against
nuisance actions even though it was “not a case where the Plaintiffs
moved to the nuisance as that expression is typically understood”). But
see Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders, Ltd. P’ship, 952 P.2d 610, 615–16
(Wash. 1998) (“[Washington’s Right-to-Farm Act] should not be read to
insulate agricultural enterprises from nuisance actions brought by an
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departure from their original intent,99 these laws have strayed from a
reasonable balancing of the relevant interests to a dramatically
imbalanced system in which agricultural interests trump individual
property interests to an inappropriate degree.100 Further, because courts
in right-to-farm cases have limited discretion in balancing the factors
involved, there is little or no opportunity to judicially correct this
imbalance.101

III. Indiana’s Right to Farm Act
Indiana’s Right to Farm Act, as amended in 2005, provides
extensive immunity to agricultural operations and significantly restricts
the circumstances in which a neighbor can succeed in a nuisance action
against such an operation.102 As a result of the amendment, the Indiana
law is no longer limited in application to the traditional coming-to-thenuisance context (immunizing agricultural operations from nuisance
liability only where the plaintiff “moved to the nuisance”).103 Instead,
agricultural or other rural plaintiff, especially if the plaintiff occupied the
land before the nuisance activity was established.”).
99.

Malanson, supra note 26, at 1587 (“[S]ome [right-to-farm] laws have
departed from the foundation on which they were built.”); see also Smart,
supra note 36, at 2100 (“While the original justification for [right-to-farm]
laws may have seemed reasonable at the outset, some states have
extended these statutory protections well beyond their originally intended
purpose.”); LaBarge, supra note 7 (“[B]roadly drafted statutes like
Indiana’s have fundamentally altered the balance of power in favor of Big
Ag.”).

100. The Court of Appeals of Indiana did not deny that its state’s Right to
Farm Act subordinated neighbors’ property interests to those of
agricultural operations. To the contrary, the court expressly
acknowledged that “the RTFA affords preferential treatment to
farmers . . . by conferring immunity from nuisance suits that are not
based on operational negligence.” Himsel, 122 N.E.3d at 948.
101. See Grossman & Fischer, supra note 96, at 117 (“The legislatures in right
to farm states have limited the courts’ discretion to balance the various
factors involved in the nuisance action. Once the requirements of the
statute are met, the court cannot weigh the policy of protecting the
agricultural operation against other concerns . . . .”). In response to this
concern, some have argued that courts should be afforded more
opportunity to balance the interests in right-to-farm cases. Pollard, supra
note 78, at 571 (“[C]ourts should institute a balancing test through which
they balance the interests of the property owners against the legislative
purpose of applying statutory immunity to farmers.”).
102. See Himsel Petition, supra note 2, at 4–6 (outlining the effect of Indiana’s
Right to Farm Act on the Himsels).
103. Id. at 4–5 (comparing Ind. Code § 32-30-6-9 (2005) with Ind. Code §
34-1-52-4(f) (1981)); see Himsel, 122 N.E.3d at 934–44 (noting that
Indiana’s Right to Farm Act, as amended in 2005, “now encompasses
coming to the potential future nuisance”).
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the law now protects agricultural operations from nuisance liability
even in cases where the plaintiff’s property use preceded the existence
of the nuisance-causing operation.104 Such a scenario is contrary to the
law’s explicitly stated policy—preventing nonagricultural land uses
from extending into agricultural areas.105 Where the agricultural
operation comes later, it is arguably that land use which is extending
into nonagricultural land uses.
All that is required to receive the law’s protection is that the
agricultural operation has been in operation “continuously on the
locality for more than one (1) year,” that “[t]he operation would not
have been a nuisance at the time the agricultural . . . operation began
on that locality,” that the nuisance not result from negligent operation,
and that there has been no “significant change in the type of
operation.”106 “[S]ignificant change” is defined narrowly under the 2005
amendment. Under the statute, “significant change” does not include:
switching from one type of agriculture to another (such as from crop
agriculture to livestock), adopting new technology, or changing an
agricultural operation’s size.107 Therefore, regardless of how significantly
such changes affect surrounding properties, those enumerated circumstances are not enough to defeat agricultural operations' immunity from
nuisance actions.108
It was based on this law that the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the Himsel defendants
on all of the Himsel plaintiffs’ claims, asserting that the “RTFA’s 2005
amendment bars all of the Himsel’s [sic] . . . tort claims because
Respondents’ switch from crops to a CAFO no longer constitutes a
‘significant change . . . in the type of agricultural operation . . . as
strictly defined under subsection (d)(1) of the RTFA.’”109 The Himsel
defendants’ switch from a decades-long practice of crop agriculture to
104. Himsel Petition, supra note 2, at 5–6; see Himsel, 122 N.E.3d at 934–44.
105. Ind. Code § 32-30-6-9(b) (2021) (“[I]t is the policy of the state to
conserve, protect, and encourage the development and improvement of its
agricultural land for the production of food and other agricultural
products. The general assembly finds that when nonagricultural land uses
extend into agricultural areas, agricultural operations often become the
subject of nuisance suits . . . . It is the purpose of this section to reduce
the loss to the state of its agricultural resources by limiting the
circumstances under which agricultural operations may be deemed to be
a nuisance.”) (emphasis added).
106. Id. § 32-30-6-9(d)(1).
107. Id.; Himsel Petition, supra note 2, at 5.
108. Himsel Petition, supra note 2, at 5–6 (“In other words, no matter how
large, damaging, or odious the transformed operation may be, injured
landowners who were there first no longer have any nuisance remedy.”
(discussing the impact of Ind. Code § 32-30-6-9(b))).
109. Himsel Petition, supra note 2, at 15 (quoting Himsel, 122 N.E.3d at 943).
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intensive, industrialized hog farming was protected by law, despite its
creating millions more gallons of noxious waste than the previous
practice, harming neighbors’ health (in Janet Himsel’s case, to the
extent that she could no longer reside in her home), and devaluing
neighboring properties by up to 60%.110
To have drawn such a line is to practically have drawn no line at
all. Even the Indiana Court of Appeals seemed to acknowledge the
astonishing breadth of this provision, writing that, under the 2005
amendment, “it is difficult to imagine what would constitute a
significant change in the type of [agricultural] operation.”111
In other words, Indiana’s Right to Farm Act deprives neighbors
like the Himsels of any legal recourse to vindicate their property rights
against neighboring agricultural operations committing what would
otherwise be actionable nuisance.112 The right to farm thus essentially
constitutes a right to commit government-sanctioned agricultural
nuisance.113
Indiana is not alone in immunizing—and thereby encouraging—
agricultural nuisance through its law. Utah,114 Nebraska,115 North
Carolina,116 Michigan,117 and Oklahoma,118 for example, have enacted
right-to-farm laws granting immunity from nuisance liability in similar
circumstances as those described above.119 Some states have gone even
110. See supra notes 2–17 and accompanying text.
111. Himsel, 122 N.E.3d at 943 n.5 (emphasis added); see also LaBarge, supra
note 7 (“It’s difficult to imagine a more significant transformation than
converting cropland to an 8,000-pig factory farm, and it’s unclear what
type or degree of change, if any, the state envisioned as actually meeting
this standard.”).
112. Himsel Petition, supra note 2, at 6, 37 (“Were it not for the 2005
amendment to the RTFA, that gross interference with the
Himsels’ . . . lives and property would be an actionable nuisance for which
state law would provide a remedy.”); cf. Grossman & Fischer, supra note
96, at 134 (“By making an historically important remedy unavailable in
some situations, right to farm statutes deprive landowners of one form of
protection against serious interferences with the use and enjoyment of
their property.”).
113. Smart, supra note 36, at 2100 (“[M]any of these amended RTF statutes
have effectively created a ‘right to commit nuisance’ as opposed to a ‘right
to farm.’”).
114. Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-41-402 to 17-41-406 (LexisNexis Supp. 2021).
115. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 2-4401 to 2-4404 (2020).
116. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 106-701 (2019).
117. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 286.471–286.474 (2018).
118. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, § 1.1 (West 2021).
119. Himsel Petition, supra note 2, at 38; Malanson, supra note 26, at 1596–
97 (“[T]he Michigan RTF law specifically provides that an operation
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further—Mississippi’s right-to-farm law, for example, serves as an
“absolute defense” against nuisance actions for agricultural operations
that have existed for at least one year.120 In these states, agricultural
interests are prioritized over the property interests of neighbors—
sometimes even if the neighbor was there before any nuisance-causing
activity came to exist—in a skewed balancing of interests. These laws
disregard fundamental and basic rights of neighbors to reasonably enjoy
their property121 and simultaneously discourage agricultural operations
from adjusting their practices to reduce their effects on neighbors.122

IV. Constitutional Concerns
Right-to-farm laws are most commonly challenged under the Fifth
Amendment as a regulatory taking and as a violation of the Due Process
Clause.123 Much commentary exists on the application of the Takings
Clause to right-to-farm laws.124 Analysis of the right to farm as a
deprivation of property interests under the Due Process Clause is less
prevalent.125 This is perhaps in part because the takings challenge is
generally considered more likely to succeed in right-to-farm cases than
conforming with GAAMPs cannot become a nuisance even if it changes
in size, adopts new technology, or changes the type of farm product being
produced.”); Smart, supra note 36, at 2101 (“Under [North Carolina’s]
amended RTF law, an agricultural operation may raise an affirmative
defense to liability in a nuisance action regardless of whether it had
undergone a change in ownership, size, or type of product produced.”).
120. Miss. Code Ann. § 95-3-29 (1972).
121. See Smart, supra note 36, at 2098 (acknowledging nuisance law as a tool
for aggrieved landowners to protect their rights in enjoyment of their
property).
122. See Malanson, supra note 26, at 1584 (“[W]ith RTF laws removing the
threat of litigation—and thus damages—the farmer has less incentive to
rein in his activities and instead may continue to foist costs onto
neighbors.”); Skaller, supra note 29, at 223 (“[I]f CAFO operators are
cognizant of the threat of a nuisance lawsuit and the associated costs,
CAFOs may conform their management practices to be less offensive to
neighbors.”).
123. Pittman, supra note 89, § 2; see Grossman & Fischer, supra note 96, at
135 n.174 (focusing on the constitutional challenge of taking without just
compensation while acknowledging a due process argument only in
footnote).
124. See, e.g., Grossman & Fischer, supra note 96, at 135–38 (focusing on
takings as the relevant constitutional challenge); Morris, supra note 28,
at 280–81 (focusing on the unconstitutional takings analysis).
125. See Morris, supra note 28, at 280–81 (discussing cases in which right-tofarm laws were challenged as unconstitutional takings, but not discussing
due process challenges to right-to-farm laws); see also Centner, supra note
87, at 87 (discussing the right to farm in relation to regulatory takings,
but not discussing the right to farm under due process analysis).

156

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 1·2021
Sanctioning Nuisance

due-process challenges.126 Still, there are compelling arguments that
some right-to-farm laws that operate beyond the traditional coming-tothe-nuisance context implicate various due process rights of neighbors.
This Note will refrain from delving into the already common discussion
of the right to farm under a takings analysis and will instead focus on
the due process analysis.
The Due Process Clauses127 entail both procedural and substantive
protections.128 Together, the Due Process Clauses dictate that government entities, whether state or federal, shall not “deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”129
Due process prohibits government from depriving one of one’s
protected interests “in a manner that shocks the conscience, regardless
of the procedure used to cause the deprivation.”130 It is a recognition
that, regardless of the nature and extent of the processes in place to
effect the deprivation, such deprivation cannot stand.131
As a threshold matter, the person asserting a deprivation of an
interest in violation of due process must establish that that interest is
protected.132 Since some right-to-farm laws deprive neighbors of the
ability to bring nuisance actions for what would otherwise be actionable
instances of nuisance, it can be said that one property interest of which
the neighbor is deprived by the right-to-farm law is the nuisance cause
of action itself.133 Such an interest in a cause of action is considered a
126. See Grossman & Fischer, supra note 96, at 135 n.174 (“Although the
substantive and procedural due process challenges are unlikely to succeed,
the taking issue may be more significant.”).
127. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies against
the states, while the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies
against the federal government. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525
(1934) (“The Fifth Amendment, in the field of federal activity, and the
Fourteenth, as respects state action . . . .”); Lawrence Alexander, The
Relationship Between Procedural Due Process and Substantive
Constitutional Rights, 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 323, 323 (1987).
128. Alexander, supra note 127, at 324 (acknowledging that the Due Process
Clauses govern both procedures “by which rules and policies are applied”
as well as some “substantive content of rules and policies”).
129. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. Const. amend. V; Alexander, supra
note 127, at 323.
130. David Hughes, Looking Behind the Due Process Label on Land Use
Decisions, 32 Colo. Law. 59, 59 (2003).
131. See id. at 60 (“Procedural protections are irrelevant to a substantive due
process analysis.”).
132. Id.
133. Grossman & Fischer, supra note 96, at 138 (“Right to farm statutes
usually deprive landowners of the right to file nuisance actions against
neighboring agricultural operations. A cause of action has long been
recognized as a species of property protected by the United States
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property interest protected for purposes of due process.134 The other
clear property interest infringed by right-to-farm legislation is the right
of the neighbor to fully use and enjoy their property.135
In the context of purely social or economic legislation, plaintiffs face
more difficult odds in succeeding on substantive due-process
challenges.136 This is because legislation in such an area need only be
supported by a rational basis.137 This is so unless the legislation
implicates a fundamental right, in which case a higher standard of
review is necessary.138 Among those rights that have been recognized by
courts as being constitutionally fundamental include that of privacy in
the home,139 intimate association through marriage,140 suffrage,141 the
Constitution. Moreover, a state tort claim is probably a property right for
purposes of constitutional protection.” (footnotes omitted)). Indeed, in
Himsel, the plaintiffs alleged that Indiana’s Right-to-Farm Act had “been
unconstitutionally applied to deny their access to the courts to enforce
[their right to use and enjoy their property].” Himsel v. Himsel, 122
N.E.3d 935, 946 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
134. See Grossman & Fischer, supra note 96, at 138, 141 (“[A] situation may
arise in which a right to farm law deprives the plaintiff of a property
interest—that is, the nuisance cause of action necessary to prevent serious
harm to property or person.”).
135. Pollard, supra note 78, at 598.
136. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (“We do not sit as
a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws
that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions.”);
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (“It is one of
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
137. Grossman & Fischer, supra note 96, at 136 n.174; Pollard, supra note 78,
at 597.
138. Grossman & Fischer, supra note 96, at 136 n.174; Pollard, supra note 78,
at 597 (“If the right infringed upon is fundamental, then the court will
apply strict scrutiny, and the state must demonstrate ‘a compelling state
interest for the law to survive a constitutional attack.’”).
139. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (identifying the right to
engage in private, consensual sexual conduct as fundamental).
140. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“Marriage is one of the
‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and
survival . . . . To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a
basis . . . is surely to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without due
process of law.”); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015) (“[T]he
right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person,
and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of
that right and that liberty.”).
141. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (acknowledging
the “political franchise of voting” as a fundamental political right). This
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right to keep and bear arms,142 the right to refuse medical treatment,143
and the right to freedom of association.144 Where a government entity
infringes on a fundamental right, due-process review requires that the
government demonstrate a “compelling state interest” for the legislative
infringement.145 Further, the means implemented in furtherance of that
compelling state interest must be narrowly tailored.146
The Supreme Court has implemented various tests for determining
the fundamentality of a given right.147 Among those tests are whether
the right falls within “immutable principles of justice” or “the very
essence of a scheme of ordered liberty,” whether the right is “so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people,”148 and whether the right
is “explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.”149
A. Fundamentality of the Affected Property Interests

Protection of private property rights is vital to economic well-being,
as well as to maintenance of individual liberty and autonomy.150 As
affirmed by President John Adams: “‘Property must be secured, or
liberty cannot exist.’”151 The right to use and enjoy one’s property has
thus been recognized for centuries and is inherent in the concept of the
property interest as a collection of a bundle of rights, rather than mere

is so because the right to vote is considered to be “preservative of all
rights.” Id.
142. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778 (2010) (“[I]t is clear
that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the
right to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to
our system of ordered liberty.”).
143. Substantive Due Process—Fundamental Rights, LawShelf, https://
lawshelf.com/coursewarecontentview/substantive-due-process-fundamentalrights/ [https://perma.cc/J425-JQQZ] (last visited Mar. 26, 2021).
144. Id.
145. E.g., Pollard, supra note 78, at 597.
146. City of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S.
188, 200 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
147. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
148. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 760 (2010) (compiling and
quoting various Supreme Court cases).
149. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33–38 (1973)
(acknowledging the societal significance of education but refraining from
holding education to be a fundamental right).
150. Steven J. Eagle, A Prospective Look at Property Rights and
Environmental Regulation, 20 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 725, 746 (2013).
151. Id. (quoting John Adams, Discourses on Davila, in 6 The Works of
John Adams, Second President of the United States 223, 280
(Charles Francis Adams ed., 1851)).
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possession of land.152 It is for these reasons that the action of nuisance
exists—it recognizes that even absent a physical trespass, interference
with the enjoyment derived from one’s land should be actionable.153
Despite its acknowledged vitality, a neighbor’s interests in enjoying
her property and in her ability to bring a nuisance action have not been
definitively recognized by courts as constitutionally fundamental.154 The
fundamentality argument can certainly be made, however, by applying
the previously mentioned tests.155
That a property owner’s interest in use and enjoyment of his
property is within “the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty”156
is supported by the fact that that interest is widely considered “one of
the important ‘sticks’ in the bundle of property interests held by the
real property owner.”157
The long-standing existence of the private nuisance cause of action
evidences the fundamental nature of the right to enjoy one’s property.158
That the right is so “rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people”159 is evidenced by the frequent inclusion of private nuisance in
literature spanning centuries.160 Blackstone wrote of nuisance that “if a
person keeps his hogs, or other noisome animals, so near the house of
152. Pollard, supra note 78, at 586–87.
153. Eagle, supra note 150, at 749.
154. Courts disagree on the fundamentality of these rights. Compare Coal. for
Equal Rights, Inc. v. Owens, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1263 (D. Colo. 2006)
(“[T]he general right to enjoy one’s property is not per se a fundamental
right . . . .”), aff’d sub nom. Coal. for Equal Rights, Inc. v. Ritter, 517
F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2008), with Lovett v. Cole, 584 S.W.3d 840, 863
(Tenn. App. 2019) (“[A] ‘property owner’s right to own, use, and enjoy
private property is a fundamental right . . . .’”) (citing Hughes v. New
Life Dev. Corp., 387 S.W.3d 453, 474 (Tenn. 2012)), appeal denied (Sept.
18, 2019). In Murr v. Wisconsin, the Supreme Court, during a takings
analysis, described property rights as “necessary to preserve freedom” but
did not explicitly label the rights as constitutionally fundamental. 137 S.
Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017).
155. See Pollard, supra note 78, at 598. Pollard argues that the “right to use
and enjoy one’s property is a fundamental property interest that is deeply
rooted in the history and tradition of the United States” and that strict
scrutiny is therefore the appropriate test. Id.
156. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 760 (2010).
157. Hensler II, supra note 77, at 31.
158. Pollard, supra note 78, at 598.
159. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 760.
160. See, e.g., 3 Blackstone, supra note 94, at *5 (“If a house or wall is
erected so near to mine that it stops my [ancient] lights, which is a private
nuisance, I may enter my neighbour’s land and peaceably pull it down.”);
see also 1 H.G. Wood, A Practical Treatise on the Law of
Nuisance in Their Various Forms 126 (3d ed. 1893) (committing a
chapter to private nuisances).
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another, that the stench of them incommodes him and makes the air
unwholesome, this is an injurious nuisance, as it tends to deprive him
of the use and benefit of his house.”161 Indeed, Blackstone enumerated
“[c]orrupting the air with noisome smells” as a discrete category of
nuisance affecting one’s dwelling place.162 This type of nuisance was
specifically enumerated as its own category because “light and air are
two indispensable requisites to every dwelling.”163
One 19th-century treatise described the right of a possessor of land
to exercise full dominion over his land as being “among the earliest
rights recognized by the courts.”164 Such right was subject only to the
qualification that exercise of that right not prohibit neighboring
possessors of land from exercising the same.165 He further emphasized
the right of a possessor of land to have the air over his land be free
from foreign gases and substances that interfere with the land
possessor’s comfort.166
Contemporary commentary has asserted that in assessing the state
of the common law, subsequent statutory enactments, and their
application to American nuisance cases, it would be difficult to find
“significant departures from the nuisance doctrine of 17th century
English common law.”167 This evidences a steadfast and consistent
commitment to traditional nuisance law and its protection of property
owners’ right to use and enjoy their properties.
Thus, it has been consistently acknowledged for hundreds of years
that enjoyment of one’s property—free from injurious smells and other
nuisances—is not only an interest of sufficient importance to warrant a
remedy, but also to be considered indispensable.168 If this does not
evidence the interest’s being “rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people,”169 then what does?
161. 3 Blackstone, supra note 94, at *217 (footnote omitted).
162. Id.
163. Id. (emphasis added). Blackstone further wrote that “it follows, that if
one does any other act, in itself lawful, which yet being done in that place
necessarily tends to the damage of another’s property, it is a nuisance: for
it is incumbent on him to find some other place to do that act, where it
will be less offensive.” Id. at *217–18.
164. 1 Wood, supra note 160, § 94, at 127.
165. Id.
166. 1 Wood, supra note 160, § 95, at 127–28.
167. Morris, supra note 28, at 286.
168. See supra notes 160–63 and accompanying text.
169. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 760 (2010). In Washington v.
Glucksberg, the Court asserted that the right to commit suicide was not
rooted in American tradition and thus was not fundamental because that
interest had been “long rejected” by “centuries of legal doctrine and
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B. Affected Liberty Interests

To limit the identification of affected interests in Himsel as only
falling within the “property” category of the Due Process Clause170 is to
mischaracterize Himsel and to trivialize the situation that the Himsels
endured and continue to endure. It was not simply a matter of an
objective devaluation of the Himsels’ home.171 Nor was it merely a
deprivation of that stick in the bundle of property rights that ensures
a property owner the ability to enjoy the use of her property.172 Of
course, those were serious burdens the Himsels were forced to
shoulder.173 But what of the other respects in which the Himsels’ lives
have been burdened and altered, and will be further altered if the
Himsels are constructively forced to leave their home?
The word “liberty” as it is used in a due-process analysis is not
constrained by a definitive list of discrete rights.174 It refers instead to
a spectrum of interests—a continuum of freedom.175 In Himsel, the
operation of the CAFO—and specifically, the courts’ sanctioning of that
operation through right-to-farm legislation—implicated other dueprocess interests in the sense that the Himsels suffered harms to their
health as a result of both their proximity to the CAFO’s toxic
pollutants and their inability to enjoin what would otherwise be
actionable nuisance.176 Cases have recognized this and similar interests
(namely, the right to bodily integrity) in due process cases where
government action harms the health of residents—whether directly, or,
as here, by sanctioning third-party behavior.177
practice.” 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997). In contrast, protection of a property
owner’s right to use and enjoy his property has long been provided through
the action of nuisance. See supra notes 158–68 and accompanying text.
170. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
171. See Himsel Petition, supra note 2, at 13–14 (alleging a 60% devaluation
in the Himsels’ property value).
172. See supra notes 152, 157 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text.
174. Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on
Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure § 15.5, at 846 (5th
ed. 2012).
175. Id. at 848 (“[A]ll human activity may constitute liberty.”).
176. See supra notes 2, 4, 112 and accompanying text.
177. Cf. Guertin v. Michigan, 912 F.3d 907, 915 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding that
plaintiffs pled a plausible due process violation of their bodily integrity
rights against various city officials where the City of Flint, with approval
from the State of Michigan, dispensed unsafe drinking water to residents,
causing E. coli transmission, hair loss, rashes, dangerous blood-lead levels,
and even fatalities among Flint residents). It was there argued, essentially,
that the dispensing of unsafe water by the city to residents constituted a
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While the right to bodily integrity usually presents itself in the
context of government-imposed punishment or physical restraint,
bodily-integrity jurisprudence as a whole has made clear that its scope
is not so limited.178 The key in such cases is the involuntary nature of
the intrusion—and there is essentially no limit on the cognizable
manner of intrusion.179
Ultimately, “a government actor violates individuals’ right to
bodily integrity by knowingly and intentionally introducing lifethreatening substances into individuals without their consent.”180 The
State of Indiana, through its Right to Farm Act, has allowed
concentrated animal feeding operations to emit harmful and toxic
substances into the surrounding air and water, causing substantiated,
serious side effects for nearby residents.181 The literature detailing these
effects spans decades and is visible to anyone who cares to look.182
Indeed, these effects are not merely general or hypothetical—Janet
Himsel was advised to no longer reside on her property due to the effect
the nearby CAFOs had on her health.183 It cannot possibly be said that
the state, in enacting its Right to Farm Act, was unaware or without
basis for knowing of the thoroughly documented adverse health effects
posed by CAFOs. This is significant because cases alleging bodily
integrity violations are considered all the more viable where they
involve such “deliberate indifference” by government.184
Further, the Himsels certainly did not consent to ingesting such
toxic substances on a daily basis—the CAFOs were constructed over
the Himsels’ and other nearby residents’ objections.185 And at the time
the Himsels purchased their property, operation of such intensive
animal-raising facilities was not even allowed under the zoning code.186
The Himsels’ “choice” of whether to continue to endure such effects is
compelled intrusion into the bodies of nonconsenting individuals in
violation of their right of bodily integrity. Id. at 920–21.
178. Id. at 919.
179. Id. (“[T]he central tenet of the Supreme Court’s vast bodily integrity
jurisprudence is balancing an individual’s common law right to informed
consent with tenable state interests, regardless of the manner in which
the government intrudes upon an individual’s body.” (emphasis added)).
180. Id. at 921.
181. See supra notes 41–54 and accompanying text.
182. See id.
183. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
184. Cf. Guertin, 912 F.3d at 924 (“It is in these kinds of situations where we
would expect plaintiffs asserting substantive due process claims based on
deliberate indifference to be most successful.”).
185. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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not much of a choice at all. Even if they were to make the painful
decision to uproot themselves, they would not financially be able to do
so without finding a buyer for their now unlivable and devalued
property.187
The Himsels also experienced restrictions on their ability to
associate and gather with loved ones and relatives in their home,
potentially implicating their freedom of association and similar
interests.188 Richard and Janet are unable to continue living together in
the home they have shared for decades and in which they planned to
spend their retirement.189 Their grandchildren can no longer safely visit
them in the home that has been in the family since 1926.190
They were ultimately forced to decide between remaining on the
property they had shared together since 1994191 and continuing to suffer
from the effects of state-sanctioned activities, or uprooting their family
and losing the life, memories, bonds, and associations with rural Indiana
that they had created over the course of multiple generations.192 The
essence of the Himsels’ lives—consisting of much that cannot properly
be quantified, but the significance of which cannot be denied—was
infringed upon, and that infringement was sanctioned by Indiana
courts.193
The mere prospect of being forced to relocate from one’s home, let
alone actually having to rip out one’s roots and attempt to transfer
them elsewhere, can be a traumatic experience “[g]iven the extraordinary importance of place, of attachments to the most minute details
of a community’s environment.”194 There is much literature dedicated
to detailing the psychological effects that forced relocation can have on

187. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 2, 7 and accompanying text.
190. Himsel Petition, supra note 2, at 7, 12, 13.
191. Himsel v. Himsel, 122 N.E.3d 935, 940 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
192. See LaBarge, supra note 7 (describing the longstanding connections the
Himsels have to the property).
193. See supra notes 16–18.
194. See Byron J. Good, Mental Health Consequences of Displacement and
Resettlement, 31 Econ. & Pol. Wkly. 1504, 1506 (1996). Indeed, in a
study of middle-class working families who were forced to relocate out of
the West End of Boston, one woman analogized the experience of moving
to that of a plant being torn up by its roots. Marc Fried, Grieving for a
Lost Home: Psychological Costs of Relocation, in The Urban Condition
(Leonard J. Duhl ed., 1963), reprinted in Urban Renewal: The Record
and the Controversy 359, 374 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1966).
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a person.195 Dislocation disrupts the lives of a place’s inhabitants in
profound and lasting ways. The experience can be intensely stressful,
can plant seeds of bitterness and resentment, and triggers grief not
unlike that of mourning a lost loved one.196
In his work on the psychological effects of forced relocation on
working-class families from the West End of Boston, Marc Fried
described feelings of post-relocation longing, social distress, and a sense
of helplessness experienced by many of those dislocated.197 An individual
attested to feeling as though her “heart [had been] taken out of [her],”
and others described feeling that some part of them had been severed
and remained in the West End.198 The study recorded startling rates of
post-relocation depression, especially among those who had felt
particularly attached to the West End prior to the relocation.199 The
experience intensely altered former residents’ sense of belonging—an
admittedly amorphous, but indisputably important, concept.200 Fried
also emphasized the importance of one’s sense of spatial identity (one’s
feeling of being at home as tied to a specific place) as being fundamental
to human functioning.201
In a more extended and far-reaching sense, dislocation touches a
person’s relationships with neighbors and community members and
may contribute to the breakdown of the family unit.202 One’s
community and residential area is the space within which “a vast and
interlocking set of social networks is localized” and is essentially “an
extension of the home.”203 Following forced relocation, individuals
described a feeling of isolation—of having lost their sense of familiarity

195. See generally Good, supra note 194 at 1504–06; Fried, supra note 194
(describing the general emotional reactions of those forcibly relocated from
the West End of Boston).
196. Good, supra note 194, at 1506; Fried, supra note 194, at 359, 369 (“[I]t is
the tenaciousness of the imagery and affect [sic] of grief . . . which is so
strikingly similar to mourning for a lost person.”).
197. Fried, supra note 194, at 359.
198. Id. at 360.
199. Id. at 360, 364 (“[T]he pre-relocation view of the West End as ‘home’
shows an even stronger relationship to the depth of post-relocation
grief.”).
200. See id. at 362–63. Fried described “belonging” as the sense of being in a
place which is “quite familiar and . . . in which one feels ‘at home.’” Id.
at 363.
201. Id. at 365–66. According to Fried, this is particularly true for the working
class—of which the Himsels, as retired farmers, are likely a part.
202. Good, supra note 194, at 1506.
203. Fried, supra note 194, at 362. The loss and disruption of these affiliations
and social connections within one’s community is “intense and frequently
irrevocable.” Id. at 366.
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with those around them.204 These impacts may not be limited to those
actually physically dislocated; the consequences can linger for
generations.205
The due-process right of association has not been limited to that of
political association—it may encompass the social benefit of
association.206 Although the Supreme Court has not recognized a
“generalized right of ‘social association,’”207 the constitutional
importance of one’s ability to gather, to maintain relationships and
companionship, and to associate with one’s community and family has
been acknowledged in various contexts.208 Because of the clear
significance of such interests, “state action which may have the effect
of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest
scrutiny.”209
Although these liberty interests may seem more amorphous than
the previously discussed property interests, this should be no reason to
disregard them. They may be more difficult to fit into discretely labeled
categories, but they are no less significant; and the identification of
which interests are definitively fundamental for purposes of due process
“has not been reduced to any formula.”210 The significance of a person’s
relationships and ties to a community—and the psychological effects
experienced following a severing of those ties—is clear.211 Where

204. Id. at 371.
205. Good, supra note 194, at 1505. Refugees and immigrants, for example,
can suffer from a sort of “cultural bereavement”—a grieving for the home
and culture one is forced to leave behind. Id. at 1506. Good acknowledges
that the dislocation of a person from their home country is, of course,
different from forced domestic resettlement to a nearby community, but
he believes the findings on mental health outcomes for refugees and
immigrants can be illustrative in a domestic context as well. Id.
206. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (“[W]e have protected
forms of ‘association’ that are not political in the customary sense but
pertain to the social, legal, and economic benefit of the members.”
(emphasis added)); IDK, Inc. v. Clark Cnty., 836 F.2d 1185, 1199 (9th
Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (“The protection of the Constitution
extends to association for social as well as political ends.”).
207. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
208. See, e.g., Russ v. Watts, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1096 (N.D. Ill. 2002)
(recognizing a due-process right of association with one’s dependent child,
“including the loss of society and companionship as secured by
the . . . Fourteenth Amendment[]”).
209. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 399, 460–61 (1958).
210. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
211. See supra notes 194–205 and accompanying text.
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reasoned judgment recognizes the fundamentality of such interests, “the
State must accord them its respect.”212
C. Distinctions in Rational Basis

Right-to-farm laws, then, necessarily implicate several property
interests: enjoying the use of one’s property; existing on one’s own
property without experiencing damaging side effects to one’s health as
a result of state-sanctioned neighboring activities; being able to sustain
a nuisance cause of action in court; and being able to retain the
associations and bonds created with one’s community. If these various
implicated interests are not considered fundamental, then the dueprocess analysis requires only that the governmental interference be
supported by a rational basis.213
To survive rational-basis review, there must first exist a legitimate
government interest to support the challenged legislation.214 Through
its police powers, the government has considerable latitude in
protecting public health, safety, and general public welfare.215 An
interest falling within that sphere of protection is considered a
legitimate government interest.216
Legislation falling within the scope of the government’s police
powers is presumed constitutional.217 In that context, surviving rationalbasis review is generally not a difficult hurdle,218 as a “law need not be

212. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015). In Obergefell, the
Court recognized that the drafters of the Constitution did not presume
that the interests enumerated explicitly therein represented the full extent
and limit of the Constitution’s protection—they anticipated “the right of
all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.” Id.
213. See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text.
214. Pollard, supra note 78, at 597 (“If the interest is not fundamental, then
the court will apply the rational basis test, and ‘the government action
need only have a rational relation to a legitimate governmental objective
to pass constitutional muster.’” (quoting Tripp v. City of Winston-Salem,
655 S.E.2d 890, 893 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008)).
215. Grossman & Fischer, supra note 96, at 141.
216. See id. at 141–42 (“The state can regulate an owner’s use of his or her
own property when that regulation is necessary to promote the public
interest.”).
217. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397 (1937) (citing O’Gorman
& Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 256–57 (1931)); see also
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537–38 (1934) (“[E]very possible
presumption is in favor of its validity . . . .”).
218. See Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 537–38 (“[The law] may not be annulled unless
palpably in excess of legislative power.”).
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in every respect logically consistent with its aims” in order to survive
rational-basis review.219
How do we characterize the government’s interest in promulgating
right-to-farm laws and thereby disturbing traditional nuisance law by
depriving neighbors of the ability to vindicate their property rights?220
Identifying the purposes and goals of right-to-farm legislation, in its
various forms, provides insight.
Some assert that right-to-farm laws promote the public welfare by
preserving agricultural lands.221 The specific concern of protecting
agricultural land from infringement by urban sprawl is a common theme
underlying right-to-farm legislation.222 The policy statements of some
right-to-farm laws explicitly address an interest in keeping nonagricultural land uses from extending into agricultural land uses.223 One
explicitly stated goal of Indiana’s Right to Farm Act is “to conserve,
protect, and encourage the development and improvement of its
agricultural land for the production of food and other agricultural
products.”224 These do constitute legitimate government interests, as
219. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955). In
Lee Optical, the Court said it was sufficient that the legislature thought
the means implemented were a rational way to correct the “evil at hand.”
Id. at 488.
220. See Morris, supra note 28, at 276 (characterizing promulgation of rightto-farm laws as “abrogat[ing] significant portions of the common law of
nuisance”).
221. Grossman & Fischer, supra note 96, at 143; see also Morris, supra note
28, at 277 (“These laws are generally enacted to further the protection of
agricultural investments and the preservation of land being used for
agricultural operations.”).
222. Grossman & Fischer, supra note 96, at 97–100 (identifying urban growth
as a threat to the maintenance of agricultural lands); Buchanan v. Simplot
Feeders, Ltd. P’ship, 952 P.2d 610, 612 (Wash. 1998) (“As more urban
dwellers moved into agricultural areas, nuisance lawsuits by those
urbanites threatened the existence of many farms.”). In Buchanan, the
Supreme Court of Washington declined to interpret the state’s right-tofarm law as protecting agricultural operations from nuisance claims
brought by “an agricultural or other rural plaintiff.” Id. at 615–16. The
court there determined that the law should be interpreted and applied
narrowly so as to only afford protection to agricultural operations in the
context of urban encroachment. Id. at 614. Similarly, in Trickett v. Ochs,
the Supreme Court of Vermont noted that “the present case . . . arises
from unique circumstances that have little to do with the problem of
urbanization.” 838 A.2d 66, 73 (Vt. 2003). The court thus declined to
allow the state’s right-to-farm law to immunize the agricultural operation
from the nuisance action brought by a rural neighbor, stating that “it is
apparent that the [statute’s] stated purpose of protecting agricultural land
from the encroachment of nonagricultural activities has no application
here.” Id. at 75–76 (alteration in original).
223. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
224. Ind. Code § 32-30-6-9(b) (2021).
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they aim generally at promoting agricultural production, which can be
said to promote public welfare.225
However, a further distinction in rational-basis review is relevant
here. Even within the standard of rational basis itself, there are differing
degrees of scrutiny.226 In Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.,227
the Supreme Court applied what is considered the “traditional and most
minimal version of the rational-basis test.”228 There, the Court rejected
a due process challenge to an Oklahoma law that mandated that only
licensed optometrists or ophthalmologists, but not opticians, could
perform certain eye care procedures.229 The Court stated that “it is for
the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and
disadvantages of the [law].”230 The Court essentially accepted that, as
long as “[t]he legislature might have concluded” that the legislation was
related to the government’s legitimate interest, that was enough to
survive rational-basis review.231 Under that standard, the Court does
not make an evaluation of the means implemented to determine
whether they are particularly effective in addressing the asserted
225. See Grossman & Fischer, supra note 96, at 141 (“The state has
considerable regulatory authority to protect the public health, safety, and
general welfare. Right to farm statutes are aimed for the most part at the
public welfare: over the long term, they are designed to ensure continued
agricultural production and a strong state economy.”); see also Pollard,
supra note 78, at 585 (“The societal need for the agricultural
industry . . . supports the implementation of the right-to-farm.”).
226. See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 18–20 (1972); Jarrett Dieterle, Differing Levels of Scrutiny for
Economic Regulations: “Anything Goes” Rational Basis v. Rational Basis
“With Bite”, The Federalist Soc’y (Apr. 26, 2017), https://fedsoc.org/
commentary/fedsoc-blog/differing-levels-of-scrutiny-for-economic-regulationsanything-goes-rational-basis-v-rational-basis-with-bite [https://perma.cc/
3KRD-S4V5]. “The switch from scrutinizing economic regulations to
ensure they were not ‘arbitrary, unreasonable, or discriminatory,’ to
rubber-stamping such infringements for ‘any hypothetical reason’
occurred during the U.S. Supreme Court’s New Deal era.” Id.
227. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
228. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 458 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part) (discussing Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 489).
229. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 486–87.
230. Id. at 487.
231. Id. at 487–88 (emphasis added). This standard has been referred to as
“‘anything goes’ rational basis scrutiny.” Dieterle, supra note 226 (quoting
Randy Barnett, Strict Scrutiny for Every Law? Remembering the Real
Carolene Products, The Volokh Conspiracy (Apr. 20, 2012, 10:34 AM),
https://volokh.com/2012/04/20/remembering-the-real-carolene-products/
[https://perma.cc/ELE4-L7VW]). That standard is satisfied “so long as
a judge can imagine any possible rational basis for a statute.” Dieterle,
supra note 226 (quoting Barnett, supra).
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interests—“[i]t is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction,
and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure
was a rational way to correct it.”232 In other words, it is an extremely
deferential standard of review.
In contrast, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,233 the
Supreme Court applied a sort of heightened rational-basis review and,
under that review, held the city’s ordinance invalid as applied.234 The
standard enunciated by the Court was that, in order to withstand
constitutional review, the legislation “must be rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose.”235 The Court acknowledged that
rational basis afforded government the “latitude necessary” to pursue
effective policies, but nonetheless determined that, through the
ordinance, the City of Cleburne had exceeded that latitude.236 This was
because, in the Court’s view of the record, there was no rational basis
for applying the ordinance to a group home but not to other property
uses that were excluded.237 In other words, the Court rejected the
asserted interests proposed by the government as applied to the group
home at issue and did not merely accede to the City’s claims underlying
the ordinance and its application to the group home.238 The ordinance
was thus held unconstitutional as applied to the group home.239
232. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 487–88.
233. 473 U.S. 432.
234. Id. at 435.
235. Id. at 446.
236. Id. at 435, 446.
237. Id. at 448 (“[T]his difference is largely irrelevant unless the Featherston
home and those who would occupy it would threaten legitimate interests
of the city in a way that other permitted uses such as boarding houses
and hospitals would not . . . . [I]n our view the record does not reveal any
rational basis for believing that the Featherston home would pose any
special threat to the city’s legitimate interests . . . .”).
238. Id. at 448–50. For example, the Court rejected the City Council’s asserted
interest in applying the ordinance to the group home as a means of
“avoiding concentration of population and [of] . . . lessening congestion of
the streets” because there was no rational reason for that concern not
extending to other property uses. Id. at 450. The Court also rejected the
City’s claim that, through the ordinance, the City was addressing the
“negative attitude of the majority of property owners” as an impermissible
basis on which to legislate. Id. at 448.
239. Id. at 450. Justice Marshall questioned whether the standard applied by
the Court truly constituted rational basis, asserting that the ordinance
would have been upheld under the “traditional rational-basis test
applicable to economic and commercial regulation.” Id. at 456 (Marshall,
J., concurring in part). He proposed that “perhaps the method employed
must hereafter be called ‘second order’ rational-basis review rather than
‘heightened scrutiny.’ But however labeled, the rational basis test invoked
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That more modern, heightened application of rational-basis review
seems to accord with the Court’s enunciation in Meyer v. Nebraska240:
one’s protected property interests “may not be interfered with, under
the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action which
is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the
competency of the State to effect.”241
Right-to-farm laws, such as that of Indiana, that so drastically
depart from traditional nuisance law and significantly curtail
longstanding individual property rights242 may not clear the relatively
low bar of rational-basis review by as wide a margin as proponents of
these laws might expect.243 Under a standard as lenient and deferential
as rational-basis review, the odds are definitively in favor of right-tofarm laws being sustained as constitutional. But there is some evidence
to suggest that the broader versions of these laws (such as that of
Indiana) do not bear a particularly close relation to the asserted end.244
At the very least, especially when considered in light of the
extensive, above-discussed policy concerns underlying CAFOs’ proximity to neighbors,245 this gives one pause.
Under the extremely deferential standard of review of Lee
Optical,246 it is perhaps quite likely that Indiana’s Right to Farm Act—
and frankly, nearly any legislation relating in some respect to the state’s
police powers—would survive a due-process challenge.247 Under the
heightened form of rational-basis review applied in Cleburne,248
today is most assuredly not the rational-basis test of Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Oklahoma . . . .” Id. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring in part).
This standard of review applied by the Court is sometimes referred to as
rational basis with bite, entailing an analysis of actual rationality and
scrutinizing the law’s actual basis. See Gunther, supra note 226; Dieterle,
supra note 226.
240. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
241. Id. at 399–400.
242. See supra notes 99–105 and accompanying text.
243. But see Himsel v. Himsel, 122 N.E.3d 935, 946–49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)
(declining to find Indiana’s Right-to-Farm Act unconstitutional). The
Court of Appeals of Indiana, in upholding Indiana’s Right to Farm Act
and barring the Himsels’ nuisance action, concluded that “[t]he RTFA is
rational and falls comfortably within the legislature’s legitimate
constitutional authority.” Id.
244. See infra notes 248–49.
245. See supra Part I.
246. See supra notes 227–32.
247. Himsel, 122 N.E.3d at 949 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). The Indiana Court of
Appeals did not analyze the legislation under a due-process framework, as
the plaintiffs did not challenge it on that basis and instead made a takings
argument. Id. at 945.
248. See supra notes 233–41.
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however, the interests underlying broad formulations of the right to
farm may not be sufficiently related to at least some of the underlying
asserted interests, such as that of preventing nonagricultural land uses
such as urban sprawl from extending into agricultural lands. But
commentators believe that “the laws will have little effect on
the . . . factors [apart from the threat of potential nuisance actions] that
encourage conversion of agricultural land to nonagricultural uses. The
laws cannot truly determine the direction of the local farm
economy . . . .”249 Certainly, as applied to the Himsels, Indiana’s Right
to Farm Act did not further the interest in preventing encroachment of
nonagricultural land uses onto agricultural lands because the Himsels’
land use preceded the subsequently protected agricultural operation.250
These laws significantly burden an array of recognized due-process
interests while simultaneously failing to achieve a more than tenuous
relationship to some of the purported state interests. This should at
minimum prompt state legislators to reconsider how the competing
interests involved are being balanced—or rather, how they have become
unbalanced.

Conclusion
The right to farm as it existed at its inception represented a
reasonable balancing of the interests between agricultural operations
and their residential neighbors.251 It achieved this by providing
agricultural operations immunity from nuisance actions in situations
where the complaining residential neighbor came to the nuisance, while
reserving the nuisance cause of action for those whose residence
preceded the existence of the nuisance-causing activity.
With the passage of time and the influence of intense agricultural
lobbying, however, that right expanded in many states to almost
completely consume the agricultural nuisance cause of action and to
leave neighbors with little to no legal recourse to protect their

249. Grossman & Fischer, supra note 96, at 161. Grossman & Fischer later
state, however, that they believe that “[d]espite their limitations, right to
farm laws can play a significant role in a state’s program to preserve
farmland.” Id. Ultimately, Grossman and Fischer concluded that: “In
terms of policy considerations, farms should not be privileged industries
protected from nuisance liability, in the absence of strong countervailing
considerations such as the preservation of farmland. When that goal is
irrelevant, right to farm statutes should not alter traditional nuisance
law.” Id. at 125.
250. See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text. See also Himsel Petition,
supra note 2, at 5–6 (“As a result of the amendment, . . . injured
landowners who were there first no longer have any nuisance
remedy . . . . Such is the situation here . . . .”).
251. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
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interests.252 The scales have become skewed to the point that in many
instances, unwitting neighbors of CAFOs who did not come to the
nuisance in any sense of the phrase, such as the Himsels, have been
forced to shoulder impermissibly heavy burdens on their liberty and
property interests. Meanwhile, CAFOs may continue to commit what
would otherwise be actionable nuisance with impunity.253
The broad formulations of these laws raise legitimate due-process
concerns—implicating obvious and objective property interests but also
other recognized liberty interests. Those concerns, in conjunction with
the numerous policy interests compelling against such broad right-tofarm protection,254 evidence that right-to-farm laws should be narrowed
back to the traditional coming-to-the-nuisance context. Doing so would
restore balance between the competing interests of agricultural
operations and neighbors and would alleviate the constitutional
concerns that accompany today’s broad formulations of the right to
farm. Furthermore, it would reduce the instances of inappropriate
application of these laws to neighbors such as the Himsels—neighbors
whose residence preceded the nuisance-causing activity and who thus
do not deserve to shoulder the heavy burdens that CAFOs have placed
on them.
Ginger Pinkerton†

252. See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
254. See supra Part II(A); see also Skaller, supra note 29, at 210 (“[I]t is
dangerous and contrary to public policy to allow CAFOs to access state
right to farm laws.”).
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